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LABOUR STANDARDS and FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 
The case of Chile 
 
Álvaro García H. 







Chile has a wide network of trade agreements and through its negotiations with countries of 
different continents has experienced a variety of frameworks, almost always including the 
labor issue. Because of this, it makes a good case study to analyze the relationship between 
labor standards and free trade agreements. 
    
Chile’s first experience of trade related negotiations that included the labor issue was at 
WTO, concretely the “Singapore Declaration, 1996”. In this meeting Chile had an active 
role in creating an international consensus on the labor standards that should constitute the 
social basis of economic globalization. This declaration enounced basic human rights and 
labors principles, such as freedom of expression and association, prohibition of forced labor 
and rejection of all forms of discrimination, that should be considered as part of the 
globalization process. At the same time, it was agreed, that labor standards should not be 
used as trade barriers nor that the lack of compliance with them could give raise to trade 
related sanctions. 
   
This discussion, as agreed in Singapore, was continued in 1998 at the ILO’s “Copenhagen 
Conference” where all participating countries agreed on the “Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up”. All countries, represented by 
governments, labor unions and entrepreneurial organizations, committed themselves to 
respect the following ILO agreements: 
? Freedom of association (Convention 87) and of labor union organization and of 
collective bargaining (Convention 98). 
? Abolition of any form of forced or compulsory labor (Conventions 29 and 105). 
? Elimination of any form of child labor (Conventions 138 and 182). 
? Elimination of all forms of discrimination at the working place (Convention 111) and in 
terms of remuneration (Convention 100). 
 
From this ILO convention onwards the international community has agreed, on several 
occasions, that it is ILO the institution in charge of establishing labor standards and of the 
surveillance of its compliance. 
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During 1998 Chile also signed a free trade agreement (FTA) with Canada which included 
an annex with labor issues. The content of this annex was very much alike the one included 
in NAFTA between the USA, Canada and Mexico. The only difference was that this 
agreement did not contemplate trade sanctions that, although in a very restricted form and 
only for extreme cases, were considered in NAFTA. The Chile-Canada FTA considers a 
dispute settlement mechanism that includes ministerial consultations and expert evaluation 
committees on labor issues. Under certain conditions this mechanism could apply monetary 
sanctions (up to U$ 10 million dollars in the case of Canada-Chile and U$ 20 million in the 
case of NAFTA). Both countries committed themselves to upgrade their labor legislation to 
give due account of their common commitments at the ILO. It also considered co-operation 
between the partners on labor issues, particularly in the area of institutions and mechanisms 
that ensure compliance.  
 
The NAFTA agreement (between Canada, Mexico and USA) also included co-operation on 
institutions and compliance related issues, but incorporated an additional area geared 
towards the improvement of the “quality and productivity of work”. This area that 
coincides with one of the most important socio -economic problems in Latin America, has 
not been present in any of the agreements negotiated by countries of this region.  
 
In December 1998, Chile signed the “Mercosur Social and Labor Declaration” where all 
parties commit themselves to respect labor standards similar as the ones agreed at the ILO. 
On this same occasion the “The Social and Labor Commission of Mercosur” was created to 
survey compliance of Mercosur members, which did not include Chile nor Bolivia given 
their character of associate members. 
 
In the FTAA meeting at Quebec in April 2001, all Heads of State of the Americas agreed 
on the importance of the labor standards issue. They ratified the consensus reached at ILO 
in its 1998 Declaration on basic labor rights and principles and committed themselves to 
promote compliance with these labor standards. A similar agreement had been reached at 
the 1998 OAS Summit in Viña del Mar and again ratified in its next summit in Ottawa, 
2001. 
 
In 2002 Chile signed a free trade and co-operation agreement with the European Union that 
although it included a democratic and social agenda it did not make a specific reference to 
labor standards. Both parties committed themselves to institutionalize a social dialogue 
mechanism that would involve workers, business and other social organizations. The 
European Union offered co-operation to carry on this commitment, but until now it has not 
been used, nor formalized the social dialogue institution in Chile. 
 
Finally, in 2003 Chile signed a free trade agreement with the USA that, for the first time, 
included the labor issue as one chapter (and not an annex) of the agreement. The labor 
aspects of this agreement will be analyzed in the next section, but again it was based on the 
ILO 1998 Declaration. 
 
As can be seen the 1998 ILO declaration defined the basic grounds for all references made 
by Chile to labor standards in its free trade agreements with very different parties, as well 
as in other multilateral and regional forums. In all cases compliance has remained a 
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domestic issue and trade sanction have not been considered. In all cases as well, some kind 
of co-operation agreement on labor issues was considered. 
 
1.- Labor standards in the Chile-USA free trade agreement 
 
As mentioned the Chile-USA free trade agreement (FTA) includes a chapter on labor 
(annex 2). The fact that the labor issue is an integral part of the agreement is unique in both 
countries experience (in the case of the USA a similar agreement and simultaneously in 
time was signed with Singapore and Jordan). This was not the position that Chile originally 
had (its proposal was to replicate the FTA with Canada where labor was an annex that had 
its own dispute settlement mechanism). Chile accepted this new framework only when it 
realized that it was inevitable in order for the American Parliament to grant the Trade 
Promotion Authority (TPA) to the President of the United States. Parliament had 
conditioned this authority to several issues that were related to labor and employment.  
 
The TPA mentions that compliance with fundamental labor standards are part of the USA 
trade objectives – as it also did in the general system of preferences that the USA has 
applied to Latin American-.  Together with the TPA the American Congress voted the 
Trade Adjustment Assistance law that provides support to the workers that might be 
negatively affected by the trade agreements. Simultaneously, although not very coherent 
with the spirit of free trade, the steel industry was protected and additional subsidies to 
agriculture were granted. 
 
An important contribution towards the acceptance, in both countries, of these labor 
conditions within the agreement was the joint declaration by the two Presidents of the 
national labor unions of Chile (Central Unitaria de Trabajadores) and the USA (AFL-CIO). 
This declaration stated that free trade agreements should be negotiated in an open and 
transparent fashion and should consider the increasing inequality among and within 
countries. They also call to respect  fundamental workers rights, as well as general human 
rights and protect the environment. In relation to the Chile-USA FTA they call their 
respective governments to include, in the main text of the agreement, a commitment to 
ensure compliance with domestic labor legislation and fundamental labor rights as defined 
by ILO. They were also explicit that the mechanisms to be created to ensure compliance 
with labor legislation should not incentive any form of protectionism. 
 
The TPA stipulates, and Chile as well as Singapore agreed, that parties should reaffirm 
their obligations as members of the International Labor Organization (ILO), particularly the 
commitments that arise from the “1998 Copenhagen Conference”. This defines a 
framework that most probably all other countries that negotiate with the United States will 
have to follow. This situation can already be appreciated in the negotiations that the USA is 
having with Central America plus Costa Rica, as well as, with Peru; although these 
countries have not expressed their agreement with this position yet.  
 
In the Chile-USA FTA both parties commit themselves to recognize and legally protect the 
labor principles and rights defined by this declaration, particularly by its article 18.8. Thus, 
each party shall strive to ensure that its laws provide for labor standards consistent with this 
declaration, particularly: 
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? The right of association. 
? The right to organize and bargain collectively. 
? Prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor. 
? Minimum age for the employment of children and prohibition and elimination of the 
worst forms of child labor. 
? Acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wage, hours of work and 
occupational safety and health. 
 
The FTA also commits both parties to effectively enforce its labor laws, although it 
recognizes the right of each party to exercise discretion with compliance matters and to 
make autonomous decisions regarding the allocation of resources to enforce labor 
standards. The setting of standards and levels in respect of minimum wages was not part of 
the agreement; each party’s obligation is to enforce the level of the general minimum wage 
established by the party. No party is empowered to enforce labor legislation in the territory 
of the other party. And, each party is responsible to ensure the enforcement and promote 
public awareness of its labor laws. 
 
The FTA created a “Labor Affairs Council” to oversee and review progress in the 
implementation of these labor standards. All decisions of this council have to be taken by 
mutual agreement and have to be made public. Any party may request consultations 
regarding the issues considered in the labor chapter. This agreement also includes a clear 
schedule (and tighter than in other agreement) to resolve the issues befo re other bodies 
intervene.  
 
If the Council fails to resolve a certain matter under consultation within 60 days other 
bodies of the FTA may intervene. First the commission of “Good Offices, Conciliation and 
Mediation” and if this does not reach an agreement four members of a Labor Roster should 
try to resolve the dispute. 12 individuals appointed by mutual agreement compose this 
roster. Neither party may have recourse to dispute settlement on any issue different than the 
enforcement of its labor laws in a matter affecting trade between the parties. The labor 
standards issues to be considered as eventually affecting trade refer to only 5 of the 8 labor 
conventions that are mentioned in the agreement (two on child labor, and the ones related to 
freedom of association, forced labor and acceptable conditions of work). 
 
The dispute settlement mechanism might impose a monetary contribution to one of the 
parties up to an amount of U$ 15 million dollars per year. This contribution must be paid in 
equal quarterly quotas and invested in improving the institutional capacity of labor 
institutions in the penalized country. If the contributions were not to be paid, the other party 
may take actions that include the suspension of foreign duty benefits, only if no third party 
is affected.  
 
It must be considered that these conditions are similar to the ones established in 1998 in the 
Canada-Chile FTA and that during the 5 years of this agreement the dispute settlement 
mechanism has never been used. In the case of NAFTA, that has a similar clause, since 
1992 only the Labor Council has been called for, never the dispute settlement body. So it 
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does not seem probable that issues related to compliance with labor standards will be 
important in the implementation of the FTA. 
 
Until now none of the labor standards related bodies of the Chile-USA FTA (Labor Affairs 
Council, Consultative Commission and Labor Roster) are in operation, given that only three 
of the six months agreed to create them have gone by. Supposedly they should start their 
operation in April 2004, two months before the agreed time limit. 
 
The Chile-USA FTA also creates a “Labor Co-operation Mechanism” to pursue the labor 
objectives of the agreement and to further advance their common commitments within the 
ILO. This co-operation mechanism may undertake co-operative action on any labor matter 
that it considers appropriate such as the fundamental rights and their effective application, 
labor relations, working conditions, social protection or issues related to small and medium 
enterprises. It also includes, among other things, the exchange of information on labor 
policies and on the application of labor laws. As well as, co-operation to promote the 
collection and publication of comparable data on labor standards, labor marke t indicators 
and enforcement activity. And research on the implication of economic integration between 
the countries for advancing each parties labor objectives. In identifying the areas for co-
operation the parties commit themselves to consider the views of their respective worker 
and employer representatives, as well as other members of civil society. 
 
This Co-operation agreement has not started its operation, although in 2002 during the 
negotiations of the FTA, the United States Labor Department and the Ministry of Labor of 
Chile signed a co-operation agreement for three years financed with U$1,7 million by the 
USA. These co-operation aims at improving the institutional capacity to enforce 
compliance of labor standards and support the activities of the Chilean government geared 
towards reforming the judicial administration of labor laws. This co-operation agreement 
should start its operations during this year, 2004. 
 
As part of this co-operation agreement delegations of both countries have visited each other 
to look at and discuss compliance with labor laws related to minimum wage and overtime, 
occupational safety and health, unfair labor practices and collective dispute resolution. The 
conclusions reached by these delegations, as stated in the co-operation agreement, is that “ 
the labor laws of Chile and the USA are considered to be fully consistent with 
internationally recognized basic labor rights, as defined in the 1998 ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work”. Given this conclusion, the co-operation 
project was focused on institutional growth not legislative change. By institutional growth 
it was considered the improvement of staff knowledge and skills, as well as institutional 
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Chile’s situation in terms of ratification of the ILO conventions is not significantly different 
from the situation in the majority of Latin American countries. In table 1 can be seen that 
Chile is, in terms of ratification, a bit above the Latin American average. After ILO 
conventions are ratified, they need to be transformed into domestic legislation in order for 
enforcement to take place.  
 
Figure 1 provides a comparison of an index of conditions of employment in world regions 
and Latin American countries. Higher values of the index indicate a greater number of 
regulations and more protective regulations for workers. The index captures what is written 
in the laws and regulations of each country on the maximum number of hours of work, 
overtime work, night shifts, holidays, maternity leave, other types of leave, and vacation 
days. As can be seen in this figure, Chile has less legal norms that protect workers than the 
majority of Latin American countries, but it has more norms than English speaking 
developed countries, East Asian countries and continental Europe. As a matter of fact Latin 
America is the second region in the world (after Eastern Europe and Central Asia) in terms 
of the number of legal norms that protect workers.  This facts ratifies the idea that meeting 
fundamental labor standards in Chile, as well as in the Region as a whole, is much more of 
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As can be appreciated the Chile-USA FTA does not add new labor standards commitments 
or raise the existing ones in any of the parties, in terms of contents nor procedures. Even 
more, both parties agreed –although not in the text of the FTA- that each other’s Labor 
Legislation is in accordance with the FTA and ILO requirements. 
 
It is also clear that the FTA does not link trade (or related sanctions) to the compliance of 
existing labor standards. Its efforts are geared towards the creation or strengthening of 
existing institutions to positively induce the public knowledge and enforcement of existing 
labor standards in each country. It explicitly recognizes the right of countries to define what 
they consider the best arrangements to promote and ensure the compliance of labor 
standards. Both parties also recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage trade or 
investment by weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic labor laws that 
should be coherent with internationally recognized labor rights.  
 
The FTA does not include any commitment to converge on labor standards, besides the pre-
existing fact that both countries had already acquired common commitments within the ILO 
framework. The FTA explicitly states that the legal implementation of such commitments is 
a domestic matter. Thus, two different labor standards that mean to interpret a unique 
principle or right, as defined by the ILO declarations, can coexist and is acceptable, 
although these differences can be the object of consultations but not of sanctions. 
 
Given that the ILO is already responsible for the monitoring and control of the rights 
defined in its conventions, this agreement does not change the existing situation in terms of 
compliance, but it does create mechanisms of co-operation to facilitate compliance and 
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increase transparency at the domestic level. Neither does it include any role for the ILO as 
the institution responsible for monitoring compliance. 
 
Although the Chile-USA FTA has not changed the situation on labor standards in neither of 
the countries and, until now, the labor institutions considered in the agreement have not 
been created, some changes on this matter can be appreciated in Chile according to the 
Labor Department, institution responsible for enforcement. Since the FTA was signed this 
institution has reached important voluntary agreements with entrepreneurial organizations 
in areas where trade with the USA is very significant (aquiculture and agriculture). These 
agreements have implied an important reduction in the number of infractions to the labor 
legislation in these economic sectors. It has also enabled an improvement in the 
surveillance methods, moving towards a preventive method based on analyzing a sample of 
firms from the industry, rather than the one based on responding claims for trespassing 
labor standards. 
 
The Labor Department experience is that the FTA had the effect of legitimising existing 
labor standards among the business community of the export oriented sectors improving 
compliance. This will probably have an effect on the economy as a whole because the 
Labor Department will not accept differences between the sectors covered by the FTA 
(because they produce tradable goods) and the rest of the workers. In order to deal with this 
new situation the Labor Department wants to move towards preventive surveillance in all 
sectors that requires new techniques and capabilities. Creating these capabilities could be 
an important aspect of the co-operation agreement already signed by the labor Ministries, as 
well as, the one considered in the FTA. 
 
2. - Labor market vulnerability and compliance with labor standards  
 
One of the most striking differences between the labor markets of developed and less 
developed countries is the relative importance of what ILO has defined as the “informal 
sector”. The informal sector is defined in two forms. The first is related to compliance with 
existing legislation: labor, taxes and social regulations. The second to the quality of work: 
productivity, stability and wages. Although these are two very different definitions, in 
practice they mostly refer to the same group of workers and enterprises. The legally 
unprotected or vulnerable workers usually work in low productivity and unstable jobs. This 
is a crucial issue because in Latin America only the majority of the workers of the formal 
sector have access to the conditions established in the Labor Code, such as contracts and 
social security. The majority of the informal sector workers not only do not have access to 
the benefits of labor legislation, but the enterprises where they work cannot afford to 
comply with it, mostly because their very low productivity levels do not enable them 
to further increase their labor costs. 
 
This issue can clearly be appreciated by comparing the differences in wages and in 
productivity for different sizes of firms. Table 2 and 3 show that in Chile the productivity 
gap between small and large enterprises is much larger than their wage gap. The average 
productivity in large firms is 6 times higher than in small enterprises and 15 times larger 
than in micro-enterprises. Table 3 shows that average wages in large firms are 34% higher 
than in microenterprises and 7% higher than in small firms. This tremendous difference 
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between the wage and the productivity gap implies that small firms are already making a 
relatively greater effort to pay higher wages and that with their present productivity level it 
is difficult to increase the cost of labor. It is interesting to note that the average productivity 
for the same size of firms varies significantly among the different regions. The metropolitan 
area of Santiago has, by far, the largest productivity levels, particularly in the larger firms. 
At the same time the poorest region (IX de La Araucanía) is the one with the lowest 
average productivity. Thus for economic or productivity reasons the probability of 
complying with labor standards is concentrated both regionally and by firm size.   
 
Table 2 
Average productivity of work by firm size. 
 
REGION Micro Small Medium SMEs. Large Total 
 I Tarapaca 0,222 0,476 1,132 0,644 1,658 0,625 
 II Antofagasta 0,417 0,613 1,079 0,759 1,631 0,817 
 III Atacama 0,311 0,481 0,468 0,476 0,761 0,416 
 IV Coquimbo 0,228 0,426 0,618 0,487 1,199 0,460 
 V Valparaiso 0,236 0,457 0,673 0,527 2,124 0,705 
 VI O’Higgins 0,261 0,406 0,451 0,423 0,909 0,381 
 VII Maule 0,205 0,342 0,669 0,422 1,735 0,395 
 VIII Biobio 0,227 0,395 0,648 0,473 1,677 0,556 
 IX Araucania 0,179 0,458 0,766 0,541 1,099 0,387 
 X Los Lagos 0,186 0,428 0,825 0,523 2,265 0,508 
 XI Aysen 0,217 0,519 0,744 0,597 0,712 0,401 
 XII Magallanes 0,310 0,614 0,929 0,723 0,714 0,475 
Metropolitan 0,257 0,610 1,102 0,796 5,575 1,587 
TOTAL 0,240 0,510 0,903 0,643 3,530 1,000 
       
Average 0,252 0,480 0,777 0,569 1,697 0,595 
       
Standar deviation 0,064 0,086 0,226 0,126 1,277 0,328 
 
Source: A García (2002). 
 
It can also be seen that workers in smaller firms have an average income that is 
significantly below the one received by the rest of the informal sector (composed basically 
by non professional self employed workers, for whom their income directly reflects their 
productivity). Thus, the very low productivity levels of the informal sector, and particularly 
of small firms, is the greatest restriction to improve compliance with labor standards for the 

















Wage earners and employers 314,428
Microenterprises (1 to 5 people) 251,109
Small companies (6 to 9 people) 313,600
Medium sized companies (10 to 49 people) 365,710
Large companies (50 or more people) 335,556
Source: CASEN, 2000  
 
Table 4 shows that in Chile the relationship between wages in different size firms are not 
significantly different that in the rest of Latin America, at least relative to the productivity 
gaps. It can also be seen that during the 90’s the wage gap between small and large firms 
grew very significantly in most countries in the Region.  
 
Table 4 




Argentina 1.02 0.96 0.96 -19.44
Bolivia 1.23 0.83 0.80 -29.12
Costa Rica 1.17 0.70 0.73 2.23
Chile 1.09 0.85 0.64 -6.40
Ecuador 1.31 0.72 0.85 3.56
Mexico 1.05 0.96 0.83 -29.09
Panama 1.26 0.53 0.67 5.15
Paraguay 1.05 0.87 1.21 -57.82
Uruguay 1.22 0.60 0.63 -16.82
Venezuela 1.04 0.94 1.04 -11.37
Latin America 1.14 0.79 0.84
Source: ILO, 2002
Relation of the average income of employees 
and the average income of other sectors
A: Percentage of variation of informal workers' income, with respect to the 
large companies employees' income.
 
 
Given that in Chile, as in most Latin American countries, the Labor Department is focused 
on the inspection and corrective action in the formal sector, a very large proportion of the 
work force is completely uncovered by its doings. Thus, the first and probably largest issue 
in terms of compliance of Labor Codes is to know the size and evolution of the informal 
sector or vulnerable groups given that they usually do not have labor contracts and thus are 
not covered by existing social obligations in the working place. 
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This situation is clearly seen in Table 6 that shows that in Chile 68,9% of the workers of 
large firms and 74% of workers in the public sector have permanent contracts at their 
working place, while only 43,9% of the workers in small firms are in the same situation.  
This gap of formal employment in different size firms is even larger in the rest of Lat in 
America. Workers in small firms plus those that are unemployed or self-employed but 































1992 5.4 34.7 8.7 2.3 19.2 21.7 8.0 51.2 48.8
1996 3.6 28.3 13.2 2.5 18.3 15.8 18.4 47.6 52.4
2001 3.5 27.1 13.8 2.5 17.6 16.2 19.3 46.9 53.1
Bolivia
1997 6.2 15.6 8.5 1.6 7.0 39.0 22.1 31.9 68.1
1999 3.5 14.6 8.2 1.2 10.9 42.0 19.7 27.5 72.5
2002 5.0 13.0 8.4 1.5 10.3 38.8 23.1 27.8 72.2
Brazil
1995 4.4 27.3 13.0 0.9 9.1 29.0 16.3 45.6 54.4
2001 4.2 28.8 11.7 1.1 10.7 26.2 17.3 45.8 54.2
Chile
1996 3.5 44.9 9.9 1.3 16.1 17.6 6.9 59.5 40.5
2000 3.6 40.6 11.6 1.6 14.5 16.3 11.9 57.3 42.7
Ecuador
1994 6.3 23.0 8.2 1.1 20.0 26.4 15.1 38.5 61.5
1998 5.9 22.9 7.6 1.1 16.8 28.4 17.3 37.5 62.5
Guatemala
2000 6.5 24.2 6.6 0.8 30.9 20.3 10.7 38.1 61.9
Mexico
1996 4.7 31.5 12.3 0.6 19.2 21.0 10.7 49.1 50.9
2000 4.8 34.5 12.0 0.9 20.1 20.1 7.8 52.1 47.9
Nicaragua
with public sector
1993 0.5 14.6 14.0 0.6 11.6 30.6 28.0 29.7 70.3
2001 5.0 23.6 7.3 0.4 18.6 26.7 18.4 36.3 63.7
without public sector
1993 0.6 17.5 - 0.7 13.5 35.4 32.4 18.8 81.2
1998 3.6 30.2 - 0.3 20.6 27.1 18.1 34.1 65.9
2001 5.0 30.6 - 0.4 18.9 26.7 18.4 36.0 64.0
Peru
1994 2.3 18.4 11.1 3.4 11.3 33.5 19.9 35.2 64.8
2000 2.3 17.6 10.3 3.0 12.6 32.6 21.7 33.1 66.9
Source: ILO, 2003




Table 5 shows that in Latin America highly vulnerable or unprotected workers are more 
than half (Chile with 42,7% is the only exemption) and up to 72% (in Bolivia) of the labor 
force. It can also be seen that during the 90’s most countries experienced an increase in the 
participation of vulnerable workers in the labor force. 
 
The participation of low productivity workers increased, in the case of the simple average 
for nine Latin American countries (and subtracting those employed in agriculture) from 
42.8% in 1990 to 46.5% in 2002 of the employed labor force. During the same period 
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unemployment grew from 9.5% to 12.2%. Thus for the region as a whole the vulnerable 























2002 37.5 83.3 10.1 40.7 35.8 82.6 8.6 36.2 42.7 84.1 14.6 51.0
Permanent contract
2002 11.9 58.4 2.0 21.0 11.4 56.8 1.3 17.4 13.4 60.4 3.9 29.2
Chile
1996 82.7 93.7 53.2 77.5 82.5 94.0 54.8 79.2 83.2 93.4 51.6 74.7
2000 83.1 92.7 50.1 77.3 83.1 92.9 51.7 79.5 83.2 92.5 48.9 74.0
Permanent contract
1996 68.3 82.8 44.7 64.9 67.6 84.4 44.2 65.6 69.8 80.8 45.2 63.7
2000 68.9 74.0 43.9 64.2 68.2 73.0 45.1 65.3 70.5 75.1 42.7 62.4
Ecuador 
1994 49.5 91.3 9.9 47.8 46.1 91.4 9.2 43.8 57.3 91.1 11.8 55.8
1998 49.4 94.7 15.3 49.3 47.0 96.3 16.1 46.9 55.1 92.6 13.7 54.2
Permanent contract
1994 35.7 81.6 7.9 38.1 32.2 82.3 7.4 34.3 43.7 80.7 9.3 45.9
1998 35.4 85.4 13.2 39.5 33.4 87.2 14.0 37.3 40.3 83.0 11.5 44.0
Guatemala
2000 42.8 84.6 11.9 43.0 40.5 79.2 10.7 37.8 45.9 77.9 13.0 43.3
México
1996 63.3 98.7 12.5 54.8 60.6 98.1 12.7 52.5 70.0 99.5 12.1 59.5
2000 64.7 92.3 10.4 53.3 62.2 91.9 9.1 49.4 70.7 92.8 13.7 61.6
Permanent contract
1996 52.1 84.9 9.9 45.7 50.3 82.9 9.8 43.6 56.5 87.8 10.2 50.0
2000 53.8 81.6 8.3 45.1 51.6 80.4 7.1 41.4 58.9 83.1 11.6 52.9
Nicaragua
1998 39.6 - 7.5 26.6 37.6 - 7.6 26.4 44.2 - 7.3 27.2
Permanent contract
1998 23.5 - 4.4 15.8 21.9 - 3.9 15.1 27.3 - 5.1 17.0
Peru
1994 32.2 37.9 6.5 27.0 31.5 37.0 5.9 25.7 33.8 39.2 8.0 29.7
2000 24.3 52.4 6.6 25.9 25.8 52.3 5.8 26.0 20.4 52.6 7.9 25.7
Source: ILO, 2003
Total wage employees Men Women
 
 
In Chile in the year 2000, 81% of the workers in the vulnerable sector did not have a labor 
contract and thus were not covered by labor legislation. Those vulnerable workers that are 
protected are mostly non professional self employed that, as was seen, have an average 
income level that is higher than the rest of the informal or vulnerable sector. 
 
If the simple average for the 9 countries mentioned in tables 5 and 6 is taken we find that 
salaried workers represent 58.6% of the labor force in these countries. Of these (in only 7 of 
the 9 countries analyzed which had the corresponding figures) only 47,4% had indefinite 
labor contracts which implies that about 28% of the labor force is enabled to the full 
benefits of the labor legislation. In Chile this figure is of 46.1%, the highest in the sample, 
which implies that less than half of the members of the work force, are covered by the 
existing Labor Code. 
 
Thus consistency of the Chilean labor legislation with internationally recognized basic 
labor rights and compliance with these codes is, as today, a relevant issue for less than half 
of the working force. Because of the strong relationship between productivity of the 
working place and the existence of labor contracts changing the situation of vulnerable 
workers is not an exclusive issue of improving the institutional capacity of the Labor 
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Department so it enforces better the existing legislation. It is also a matter of increasing 
productivity in the smaller enterprises, which requires investment in the firm as well as in 
the human capital of the worker.  
 
Unfortunately this crucial issue for more than half of the labor force in Chile, and 70% of 
the employed in the rest of the countries that were analyzed, was not considered as part of 
the co-operation agreement, as it was included in the case of NAFTA. 
 
3. - Labor Standards in Chile 
 
There are no studies that enable a strict quantification of compliance with the different 
labor standards in Chile. Existing information only permits to analyze the amount of people 
that are covered or profit from some of the standards or rights covered by the conventions 
included in the FTA that Chile has signed. The cases of freedom of association, collective 
bargaining, child labor and conditions of work (including minimum wages, hours of work 
and occupational health and safety) will be analyzed in the next sections. 
 
Another way of approaching this issue is analyzing the number and type of claims for 
infractions of labor standards denounced in the Labor Department. In tables 7 and 8 can be 
seen that, in the year 2003, 80.600 claims were placed and 60.586 infractions were given. If 
we consider that over 2.000.000 workers have a contract in Chile, the incidence of both 
claims and infractions is not very significant. 
 
Table 7 





Termination of employment contract 31
Daily rest 3,649
Dismissal of workers with protection 49
Annual holidays 444

























Social security benefits 14,686
Employment contract 17,949
Social security contributions 8,500
Annual holidays 1,492
Sanitary and safety 3,549







Source: Ministry of Labor of Chile  
 
The most recurrent issue in claims, 29% of them, is payments for soc ial security. An issue 
that is not explicitly covered by the labor standards recognized in the Chile-USA FTA. The 
other relevant issues are wages, working hours and labor contracts that are partially 
considered in the FTA. These latter ones are also the most relevant issues if infractions 
given by the Labor Department are considered.  
 
The other issue to be considered is the institutional capability of enforcement of labor 
standards. Again only very general indicators can be elaborated. In table 9 can be 
appreciated that the number of public officials in charge of surveillance per 100.000 
workers is significantly higher in Chile than in Argentina, Brazil and Peru.  
 
Table 9 









Source: IDB, 2003  
 
This indicator does not provide any basis to compare methods and efficiency in the 
enforcement procedures, which can be a very relevant issue. According to the statistics of 
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the Chilean Labor Department, without experiencing significant changes in the  number of 
public officials, its efficiency has improved significantly. Only during last year (2003) the 
number of enterprises that were object of surveillance increased in 99%, in 23% the number 
of infractions that were given and in 66% the number of agreements on labor standards 
reached with enterprises. If all types of surveillance procedures are considered the rate of 
growth was 12,5%.  This implied that the number of workers that were covered by the 
procedures of the labor department increased in 62% and the amount of time required to 
respond for an action demanded from the labor department was reduced by 43%. 
 
These figures reinforce the notion that the enforcement problem is not only an issue of 
institutional size, but mostly of methodologies and efficiency. These are precisely the issues 
that are considered in the co-operation agreement between the Chilean and American 
Ministry of Labor. 
 
3.1- Freedom of association and collective bargaining. 
 
Although Chile presents an increasing number of claims for not fulfilling the right of 
freedom of association, they are not significant in number (see Annex, Table 1A). Last year 
1.004 claims related to labor unions were placed, and 418 infractions were given by the 
Labor department related to this issue. A similar figure occurred in the case of collective 
bargaining (1.137 claims and 447 infractions). In Chile, as can be seen in figure 2, the 
existence of collective bargaining is strictly related to the existence of a labor union. 
 
Figure 2 
Chile: Percentage of firms with collective bargaining during the last five years 
 
Source: ENCLA, 2002







The percentage of unionized workers has decreased in a very significant manner (Figure 3). 
In the early 90`s 20.8% percent of Chilean labor force belonged to a labor union. This 
figure was cons istent with the situation in the USA and the Latin American average 
(21.1%). In the second half of the 90’s this indicator decreased to 13.1%, well bellow the 











Unionization Rates, 1990-1995 and 1996-2000 
 
Source: ILO, 2002




























Table 10 presents information from the labor department that shows a lesser reduction in 
the participation of unionized workers, but still that the number of workers that belong to 
labor unions have decreased in absolute terms since 1991-92 when affiliation reached its 
peak. This has occurred at the same time that the number of unions has permanently 
increased, which shows that these institutions have decreased very significantly in size 
(about half of the size they had in the early 90’s). It is interesting to note that although 

































1990 8,861 606,812 68.5 4,445,781 13.6
1991 9,858 701,355 71.1 4,506,175 15.6
1992 10,756 724,065 67.3 4,704,259 15.4
1993 11,389 684,361 60.1 4,977,837 13.7
1994 12,109 661,966 54.7 5,033,112 13.2
1995 12,715 637,570 50.1 5,092,175 12.5
1996 13,258 655,597 49.4 5,162,841 12.7
1997 13,795 617,761 44.8 5,274,222 11.7
1998 14,276 611,535 42.8 5,370,171 11.4
1999 14,652 579,996 39.6 5,258,395 11.0
2000 14,724 595,495 40.4 5,311,458 11.2
2001 15,192 599,610 39.5 5,321,908 11.3
2002 16,310 618,930 37.9 5,381,724 11.5
2003 16,914 665,480 39.3 5,538,076 12.0
* Ratio of the union members to the Employed population
Source:  Employed population, Central Bank of Chile; Union Members and number 
of unions, Ministry of Labor of Chile.  
 
The period of expansion of unionization coincided with a period of expansion in the rate of 
unemployment. While the period of reduction in the number of workers that belonged to 
labor unions coincided with one of rapid growth both of employment and salaries. On the 
other hand, the reduction in the representation of labor unions during the 90’s in Chile 
coincided with a change in the relationship between the growth of productivity and wages 
in the same time period. Between 1990-94 average productivity increased 4,9% and the 
evolution of wages in the industrial sector (the most unionized private sector) increased 5%. 
In the second half of the decade 1995-2000 average productivity increased 4,4% and 
industrial wages 3,3% which redistributes income against workers. 
 
Although the unionization rate decreased significantly, the protection of collective 
bargaining in Chile is high in relative terms. Chile, as can be seen in figure 4, has an index 
of 0.78 on this issue, while the average of the world is 0,44 and of developed countries is 
0,39. The majority of Latin American Countries show a better index than Chile. In other 
words, in Chile –in relative terms- there are nor very many labor unions, but the ones that 













Protection of Collective Bargaining 
(Index, 0-3) 
Source: Djankov and others (2003).
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The existence of unions is very much correlated with the sizes of firms. The following 
information comes from a survey done by the Ministry of Labor in Chile and covers firms 
of the formal sector with more than 5 employees and thus differs from the base considered 
in the tables shown above (that consider all the labor force). It can be seen that the presence 
of unions is over 50% in medium and large enterprises, but around 10% in the smaller ones 
(figure 5). Also that almost 100% of the enterprises with labor unions had collective 
bargaining, while less than 5% of the ones that did not have a union went through the 
process (figure 2). In table 11 it can be appreciated that although labor unions are the most 
relevant actor in the collective bargaining process, the instrument of this process have been 






























Chile: Instruments of collective bargaining 
(Percentage of total conventions and contracts) 
 
1998 1999 2002
Convention bargained by group 21.8 21.6 19.6
Convention bargained by union 24.8 27.8 45.2
Contract bargained by group 6.1 4.8 5.5
Contract bargained by union 47.3 45.7 29.7
Source: ENCLA, 2002  
 
In Chile the majority of employers of the formal sector feel that labor unions are good for 
the firm (60%) or are indifferent about them. Only one of every 10 thinks that labor unions 
are a source of difficulties for the firm (figure 6).  Also the majority of the employees feel 
that within the firm prevails a climate of collaboration, but this percentage is higher in firms 


























Chile: Opinion of the labor climate according to the existence of collective bargaining the 
last five years 
 
Yes No Total
Always there is an atmosphere of tranquillity 
and collaboration
30.7 53.7 84.4
Although sometimes there are tensions, in 
general it is calm
63.7 43.4 107.1
There are as much days of tension as of 
tranquillity
4.4 2.7 7.1
There are more days of tension than of 
tranquillity
1.2 0.1 1.3
There is almost permanent tension 0.1 0.2 0.3
Source: ENCLA, 2002  
 
Chile is a country where freedom of association and collective bargaining is legally 
protected. Labor unions seem to be a crucial actor for collective bargaining to take place, 
and employees do not seem to have a bad opinion about their level of collaboration within 
the firm. But during the 90’s the representation of labor unions decreased drastically and 
with it the quality of the collective bargaining agreements. This experience reaffirms the 
notion that compliance with labor standards is not only a legal issue not even one of 
enforcement, but in this case of promotion. If collective bargaining is going to cover a 
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larger percentage of the labor force, more labor unions should be organized, but Chile 
seems to be moving in the opposite direction.  
 
 
3.2.- Child labor 
 
As can be seen in Table 13, in Chile 4.16 % of children work while in Latin America the 
average is 15%. There are many countries in which this is a very relevant issue, with 20 to 
30% of their children working. 
 
Table 13 
Latin America (19 countries): Estimated figures for child labor 
 
Country Total population 




between 10 and 14 
years of age
Percentage
Argentina 3,197,582 214,238 6.70
Bolivia 386,222 54,549 14.12
Brazil 17,588,115 3,599,747 20.47
Chile (**) 763,732 31,782 4.16
Colombia (*) 2,327,823 367,796 15.80
Costa Rica (*) 203,893 26,009 12.76
Ecuador 1,391,433 420,663 30.23
El Salvador 661,176 85,516 12.93
Guatemala 1,325,725 316,061 23.84
Haiti 847,706 158,182 18.66
Honduras 778,714 88,264 11.33
Mexico 10,934,134 1,233,353 11.28
Nicaragua 575,137 42,310 7.36
Panama 278,631 12,603 4.52
Paraguay 602,417 49,097 8.15
Peru (*) 4,928,899 801,033 16.25
Dominican Rep. 871,144 42,302 4.86
Uruguay 253,846 5,780 2.28
Venezuela 3,205,592 80,781 2.52
TOTAL 51,121,921 7,630,066 14.93
Source: ECLAC, 2001.
(*) Total child population and economically active child population calculated on 
the basis of the 12-14 age group.
(**) Total child population and economically active child population calculated 
on the basis of the 6-14 age group.
(***) Total child population and economically active child population calculated 




In tables 14, 15 and 16, that come from a different study and have different definitions, can 
be appreciated that the majority of the children who work are between 12 and 14 years old 
and 66% of them are occasional workers. The correlation between levels of poverty and 
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child labor is not very strong. Although the proportion of extremely poor children that work 
is higher than the one of poor children and this in turn is higher than non poor, but the 
differences are less than 5 percentage points between extremely poor and non poor. The 
correlation with unemployed parents seems to be stronger, particularly in the case of 
children that work regularly. 
 
The cost in terms of education for those children that work regularly is extremely high, 
their unattendance rate is 15 times larger than the one of children that do not work and four 
times larger than the one of children who work occasionally. 
 
Table 14 
Chile: Child labor, by poverty line 
(Percentage) 
 
Indigent Poor Not Poor
Work regularly 2.1 1.4 1.3
Work occasionally 5.7 4.1 2.0
Do not work 92.1 94.5 96.6
Did not answer 0.1 0.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0




Chile: School attendance by children between 6 and 14 years of age, by working frequency. 
1996 
 




Do not work 2.4
Total 3.0




Chile: Unemployment rate and years of schooling of children's between 12 and 14 years of 
age heads households, by working frequency 







of years of 
schooling
Work regularly 5.5 6.6
Work occasionally 2.2 7






Although child labor does not seem to be a significant problem in Chile, it has an important 
cost for the child. Besides improving enforcement activities, the other variable that might 
reduce child labor is the existence of unemployment insurance given the fact that the 
majority of children who work regularly have unemployed parents. 
 
 
3.3.- Acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of 
work, and occupational safety and health 
 
As was seen at the beginning of this chapter the issues related to working conditions 
constitute an important proportion of the claims for not fulfilling labor standards in Chile, 
at the same time they are the largest proportion of the infractions given by the Labor 
Department. But, neither of these two figures are very significant in size, relative to the 
proportion of the labor force that ha s contracts. 
  
The minimum wage legislation is generally respected in Chile. Figure 7 shows that 6% of 
the employed workers receive less than 75% of the existing minimum wage, which is about 
the median in Latin America. In this Region we can find a very clear relationship between 
the percentage that the minimum wage represents of the median wage and the percentage of 
workers that earn less than the legal minimum. As expected the higher the minimum wage 
–in relation to the median- the higher the percentage of workers that earn less than the 
minimum. Chile behaves in a similar way than the rest of the countries, its relative 
minimum wage is higher than in any country that has a lower percentage of workers 
earning less than the minimum (figure 8). 
 
Figure 7 




Source: IDB, 2004. 
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In Chile, as in the rest of Latin America, the great majority of the workers that earn less 
than the minimum wage work in enterprises of less than 5 employees. Also its incidence is 
higher among rural workers and those that only have primary education (table 17). Which 
again calls attention to the issue of productivity and the capability of the firm to comply 
with labor legislation. 
 
Table 17 




Country Year Primary Secondary Tertiary Rural Urban Less than five More than five Total
Argentina 2001 8.90 2.64 0.54 3.07 8.51 7.67 3.07
Bolivia 1999 5.01 0.43 0.00 0.36 1.21 4.53 0.06 1.10
Brazil /1 1999 16.16 2.21 0.08 20.38 3.84 21.69 0.37 5.83
Chile 1998 26.72 7.36 0.77 22.96 5.41 17.54 4.38 7.25
Colombia 1999 59.37 23.62 40.60 54.37 17.38 26.90
Costa Rica 2000 29.02 9.72 2.48 23.25 9.21 42.45 7.98 15.66
El Salvador 1999 7.98 2.00 0.23 8.34 2.00 7.87 2.72 3.58
Honduras 1999 10.31 1.42 0.69 11.07 3.19 16.01 2.70 5.88
Mexico 2001 1.48 0.35 0.16 0.52 2.18 0.19 0.52
Nicaragua 2001 59.83 22.88 6.23 56.82 27.58 61.49 26.95 35.58
Panama 2000 32.79 17.60 2.08 19.22 13.19 53.06 6.95 14.78
Peru 2000 66.21 27.26 9.20 52.31 16.38 46.11 14.69 23.46
Uruguay 2000 1.23 0.34 0.13 0.46 2.18 0.15 0.46
Venezuela 1999 35.83 14.31 6.09 41.37 12.20 17.91
Median 21.44 5 0.73 21.65 3.84 17.54 2.72 6.57
1/ Firm size refers to employees without a contract ç, not to the number of workers.







Compliance with the legislation on hours of work is less strict. 31.5% of workers from 
formal sector and 38.6% of workers from informal sector work more than what labor 
legislation stipulates (Figure 9). It can also be appreciated that this percentage has not 
changed significantly in the last few years, although the number of working hours per day 
have been decreasing mildly (table 18). 
 
Figure 9 
Chile: workers with 49 or more weekly working hours, by economic sector 
(Percentage) 
 
Source: CASEN 1990, 1994, 1997, 2000











Chile: Estimation of average working and rest hours 
 
1998 1999 2002
Weekly workdays 5.5 5.5 5.5
Weekly rest days 1.5 1.5 1.4
Daily working hours 8.7 8.8 8.5
Lunch minutes 67.6 71.2 43.4
Other pauses minutes 4.9 5.5 25.9
Source: ENCLA, 2002  
 
In order to analyze compliance with the norms on occupational health and safety we will 
use the ENCLA surve y that, as mentioned, only includes formal enterprises and thus its 
results are biased in favor of compliance. In figure 10 can be seen that about 80% of formal 
firms in Chile have security and sanitary rules and a department of risk prevention, as well 
as, the participatory committee on health issues that the legislation mandates. In figure 11 
can be appreciated that noncompliance of risk prevention differs very significantly among 
sectors. Those sectors that produce goods –with the exception of the public utility sector- 
have a lower percentage of noncompliance than the average (20%). The opposite is true in 
the service sector where noncompliance climbs up to 37% in the financial sector. This 
explains why the majority of the workers feel that the basic sanitary conditions are good or 




Chile: Instruments of risk prevention 
 
Source: ENCLA, 2002
Note: The department of risk prevention considers only firms with 100 or more employees. The 
safety and sanitary committee, the companies with 25 or more workers; and se safety and sanitary 
internal rule considers all the companies.
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Chile: Noncompliance of instruments of risk prevention 
 
Source: ENCLA, 2002















Chile: Conditions of working establishment 
 




Do not exist 23.2 0.7
Sanitary conditions includes: sanitary services, restaurant and showers
Physical place includes: space, illumination, ventilation
Source: ENCLA, 2002  
 
As could be appreciated conditions of work are generally acceptable in the Chilean formal 
sector. The only variable that showed significant rates of non-compliance was the standard 
on hours of work. Again it was found that smaller firms –even of the formal sector- had 
lower rates of compliance than larger firms and that when the information to make 






Almost all the free trade agreements that Chile has signed consider -although in different 
ways- the need to comply with the labor standards present in the domestic legislation. And, 
in most cases, the parties in the agreement have committed themselves to recognize and 
legally protect the labor principles and rights defined by the ILO, particularly the ones 
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agreed in the 1998 “Copenhagen Conference”. In general all parties that have concurred to 
these FTA’s with Chile, already have a labor legislation that gives due account of the 
mentioned labor principles and rights. 
The FTA’s signed by Chile have not included any commitment to converge on labor 
standards, they all explicitly state that legal implementation if such commitments is a 
domestic matter. 
 
Chile’s experience with free trade agreements and labor standards leads to believe that this 
issue will become an integral part of future free trade agreements, particularly in the 
American continent (FTAA). There are many arguments to support this proposition: 
? The growing consideration of labor standards in the signed agreements. The USA 
has never signed a FTA where LS have not been considered. Chilean experience is 
that this issue acquires an increasing importance in free trade negotiations. All 
ongoing negotiations that include North American countries are contemplating this 
issue. 
? The fact that all American countries, in very different forums, have committed 
themselves to comply with ILO’s LS. Even more they have accepted that 
compliance with them should be part of the globalisation process, although trade 
sanctions have never been accepted, nor are they part of the present scheme of 
incorporating LS in trade negotiations.  
? The inclusion in the American TPA of LS as an integral part of the FTA forces the 
US government. It does not seem probable that the US Congress will change this 
condition especially when compliance with LS in the rest of Latin America 
(besides Mexico and Chile) is considered. As was seen Chile is relatively better off 
than the rest of the countries of the region in terms of enforcement and compliance 
with LS. 
? The employment issues, including stability and conditions at work, is and has been 
the most important problem for Latin Americans. It seems politically difficult to 
avoid commitments in this area. In the case of Chile the agreement reached by the 
American and Chilean labor unions in terms of incorporating labor standards in the 
FTA was an important reason to accept this inclusion.  
? Issues related to labor standards have already been present in trade disputes 
between Latin American countries and the USA, as part of the claims of dumping 
that American firms have made. It seems better for Latin America to negotiate this 
issue rather than be comfronted to unilateral action.   
 
Chile’s, short lived, experience on this matter tells us that the inclusion of the labor 
standards issue as part of the agreement will not imply any legal changes nor will trade be 
affected with sanctions because of non-compliance with LS. Even more, the longer 
experience of NAFTA and the Canada-Chile FTA leads to believe that the labor issue will 
not be an important source of disputes. This does mean that the LS issue is not important in 
Latin America, on the contrary compliance with them is still a major issue. Three main 
reasons for this lack of compliance were identified: 
? There is a large proportion of the labor force (in Chile it is 54% and the simple 
average for Latin America is 72%) that does not have access to labor standards 
because they do not have a formal labor contract. Almost all unprotected or 
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vulnerable workers are unemployed, work in small enterprises or on their own (non-
professionals). These, at the same time are the lower productivity sectors and thus 
face economic restrictions to formalise their enterprises and to comply with existing 
legislation. Unfortunately vulnerable workers seem to be increasing in size and in 
relative terms in Chile and Latin America. 
? Within the formal sector and particularly in large firms, there is a relatively low 
level of non-compliance with LS, although it varies among standards and sectors. 
Smaller firms, within the formal sector, have relatively less labor unions and 
collective bargaining and show less compliance with LS. Social security, that until 
now has not been part of the negotiations, is the most important claim for non-
compliance in Chile. The fact that there are important sectoral differences might 
become an issue if non-compliance is important in a sector that is relevant in terms 
of trade or investment for the USA (i.e. minimum wage in the agricultural sector or 
conditions of work in the financial sector).  
? There is large room for progress on institutional capacity for the labor market. 
Increasing efficiency of enforcement institutions is related to enforcement practices, 
institutional capabilities, as well as, with the level of cooperation of the employer 
and enterprise. Progress in this area is a tremendous challenge, which could make 
an important contribution for equitable growth. Several studies have shown that the 
weakness in these institutions prolongs the effect of external shocks in Latin 
America, decreasing the average rate of growth and employment generation. 
Institutional change should be assumed in integral manner, that is considering 
public institutions and employees, the judicial sector and the creation or 
strengthening of institutions for social dialogue. A partial advance, this is in only 
one of these areas will not produce the expected results. 
? Compliance or access to some rights or standards is very much related to the 
existence of labor unions within the firm. In Chile and Latin America, the presence 
of unions are decreasing and with it the coverage and quality of collective 
bargaining. In those firms with labor unions the entrepreneurial opinion is 
favourable to both unions and collective bargaining. Promotion of labor standards 
and of social organisation is a necessary component of any program to ensure 
compliance with LS. 
 
The labor commitments acquired in the FTA’s have not changed at all the legal obligations 
that Chile already had. The difference, after the FTA’s, lays on the eventual impact of the 
cooperation agreements related to labor issues that have accompanied the signature of these 
agreements. Also the fact that FTA’s have included the labor standards issue seem to have 
had a positive effect on entrepreneurial awareness and disposition to comply with this 
standards. This, in turn, has facilitated the enforcement activities of the Labor Department 
and thus it’s operating efficiency and outcome. 
 
Even though the cooperation agreements on labor issues considered in the FTA’s signed by 
Chile are still not operating, they are geared towards institutional building. Improving the 
capabilities of the enforcement institution  (in the cases of Canada and the USA) and 
towards promotion of social dialogue in the case of the European Union. The strengthening 
of the judicial sector on labor issues is also mentioned in the Chile-USA FTA. Until now 
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this agreements have not considered cooperation on programs to improve the quality of low 
productivity jobs or the personal capacities of vulnerable workers which seems to be the 
larger problem. Even more, the FTA’s signed by Chile have not implied immediate drastic 
differences in the level of direct and indirect protection of sectors –such as agriculture- 
where many of these workers are employed.  
 
Given that the LS issue will inevitably be part of trade negotiations in the Americas it is 
useful to learn from Chilean experience to define how and what should be negotiated. If 
there is a common interest in increasing the number and proportion of workers protected by 
LS in Latin America, two aspects not covered by the Chilean cooperation agreements 
should be considered. 
? The inclusion of co-operation on the issue of “low productivity jobs”. This possibility 
has an important precedent in NAFTA, but it has not been considered in any 
negotiations with the rest of Latin America.  
? Increasing the export possibilities of those sectors that employ vulnerable workers is a 
very direct way to create conditions for the improvement of labor standards compliance. 
Given that one of the arguments in developed countries not to open this sectors is the 
existence of unfair trade or social dumping a commitment to open these sectors coupled 
with a commitment to improve labor conditions in the less developed countries could 
benefit both parties. 
 
Besides this new areas Chile’s experience of receiving cooperation on institutional building 









Countries 1990-1995 1996-2000 Index          
1990-1995=100
Argentina 13.2 12.6 78.9
Brabados 0.0 0.8 n.s.
Bolivia 1.4 0.8 50.0
Brazil 2.1 5.9 233.3
Chile 1.4 5.0 300.0
Colombia 8.3 10.9 108.3
Costa Rica 4.2 9.2 183.3
Ecuador 6.3 3.4 44.4
El Salvador 5.6 3.4 50.0
Guatemala 6.9 10.1 120.0
Honduras 2.8 0.8 25.0
Mexico 0.7 4.2 500.0
Nicaragua 5.6 3.4 50.0
Panama 2.1 4.2 166.7
Paraguay 6.9 3.4 40.0
Peru 16.7 10.9 54.2
Dominican Rep. 3.5 0.0 0.0
Uruguay 2.1 3.4 133.3
Venezuela 10.4 7.6 60.0
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 82.6
Source: ILO, 2002
Complaints examinated by the ILO Committee on 










Annex 2: The Labor Chapter in the Chile-USA FTA 
 
Article 18.1: Statement of Shared Commitment 
1. The Parties reaffirm their obligations as members of the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) and their commitments under the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up (1998). Each Party shall strive to ensure 
that such labor principles and the internationally recognized labor rights set forth in Article 
18.8 are recognized and protected by its domestic law. 2. Recognizing the right of each 
Party to establish its own domestic labor standards, and to adopt or modify accordingly its 
labor laws, each Party shall strive to ensure that its laws provide for labor standards 
consistent with the internationally recognized labor rights set forth in Article 18.8 and shall 
strive to improve those standards in that light. 
 
Article 18.2: Enforcement of Labor Laws 
 
1. (a) A Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its labor laws, through a sustained or 
recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the Parties, after 
the date of entry into force of this Agreement. 
(b) The Parties recognize that each Party retains the right to exercise discretion with respect 
to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters and to make decisions 
regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to other labor matters 
determined to have higher priorities. Accordingly, the Parties understand that a Party is in 
compliance with subparagraph (a) where a course of action or inaction reflects a reasonable 
exercise of such discretion, or results from a bona fide decision regarding the allocation of 
resources. 
 
2. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage trade or investment by 
weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic labor laws. Accordingly, each 
Party shall strive to ensure that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to 
waive or otherwise derogate from, such laws in a manner that weakens or reduces 
adherence to the internationally recognized labor rights referred to in Article 18.8 as an 
encouragement for trade with the other Party, or as an encouragement for the establishment, 
acquisition, expansion, or retention of an investment in its territory. 18-2 
3. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to empower a Party’s authorities to undertake 
labor law enforcement activities in the territory of the other Party. 
 
Article 18.3: Procedural Guarantees and Public Awareness 
 
1. Each Party shall ensure that persons with a legally recognized interest under its law in a 
particular matter have appropriate access to judicial tribunals of general, labor or other 
specific jurisdiction, quasi- judicial tribunals, or administrative tribunals, as appropriate, for 
the enforcement of the Party’s labor laws. 
 
2. Each Party shall ensure that its proceedings for the enforcement of its labor laws are fair, 
equitable, and transparent. 
 
3. Each Party shall provide that the parties to such proceedings may seek remedies to 
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ensure the enforcement of their rights under domestic labor laws. 
 
4. For greater certainty, decisions by each Party’s judicial tribunals of general, labor, or 
other specific jurisdiction, quasi-judicial tribunals, or administrative tribunals, as 
appropriate, or pending decisions, as well as related proceedings, shall not be subject to 
revision or reopened under the provisions of this Chapter. 
 
5. Each Party shall promote public awareness of its labor laws. 
 
Article 18.4: Labor Affairs Council 
 
1. The Parties hereby establish a Labor Affairs Council, comprising cabinet-level or 
equivalent representatives of the Parties, or their designees. 
 
2. The Council shall meet within the first year after the date of entry into force of this 
Agreement and thereafter as often as it considers necessary to oversee the implementation 
of and review progress under this Chapter, including the activities of the Labor Cooperation 
Mechanism established under Article 18.5, and to pursue the labor objectives of this 
Agreement. Each meeting of the Council shall include a public session, unless the Parties 
otherwise agree. 
 
3. Each Party shall designate an office within its labor ministry that shall serve as a point of 
contact with the other Party, and with the public, for purposes of carrying out the work of 
the Council. 
 
4. The Council shall establish its work program and procedures and may, in carrying out its 
work, establish governmental working or expert groups and consult with or seek advice of 
non-governmental organizations or persons, including independent experts. 18-3 
 
5. All decisions of the Council shall be taken by mutual agreement of the Parties and shall 
be made public, unless the Council decides otherwise. 
 
6. Each Party may convene a national consultative or advisory committee, as appropriate, 
comprising members of its public, including representatives of its labor and business 
organizations and other persons to provide views regarding the implementation of this 
Chapter. 
 
7. Each Party’s point of contact shall provide for the submission, receipt, and consideration 
of public communications on matters related to this Chapter, and shall make such 
communications available to the other Party and the public. Each Party shall review such 
communications, as appropriate, in accordance with its domestic procedures. 
 
Article 18.5: Labor Cooperation Mechanism 
 
Recognizing that cooperation provides enhanced opportunities for the Parties to promote 
respect for the principles embodied in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work and its Follow-up (1998), compliance with ILO Convention 182 
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Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms 
of Child Labor (1999), and to advance other common commitments, the Parties hereby 
establish a Labor Cooperation Mechanism, as set out in Annex 18.5. 
 
Article 18.6: Cooperative Consultations  
 
1. A Party may request consultations with the other Party regarding any matter arising 
under this Chapter by delivering a written request to the point of contact that the other Party 
has designated under Article 18.4(3). 
 
2. The Parties shall consult promptly after delivery of the request. The requesting Party 
shall provide specific and sufficient information in the request for the other Party to 
respond. 
 
3. The Parties shall make every attempt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of the 
matter and may seek advice or assistance from any person or body they deem appropriate in 
order to fully examine the matter at issue. 
 
4. If the Parties fail to resolve a matter through consultations, either Party may request that 
the Council be convened to consider the matter by delivering a written request to the other 
Party’s point of contact. 18-4 
 
5. The Council shall promptly convene and shall endeavor to resolve the matter, including, 
where appropriate, by consulting outside experts and having recourse to such procedures as 
good offices, conciliation, or mediation. 
 
6. If the matter concerns whether a Party is conforming to its obligations under Article 
18.2(1)(a), and the Parties have failed to resolve the matter within 60 days of a request 
under paragraph 1, the complaining Party may request consultations under Article 22.4 
(Consultations) or a meeting of the Commission under Article 22.5 (Commission – Good 
Offices, Conciliation, and Mediation) and, as provided in Chapter Twenty-Two (Dispute 
Settlement), thereafter have recourse to the other provisions of that Chapter. 
 
7. Neither Party may have recourse to dispute settlement under this Agreement for any 
matter arising under any provision of this Chapter other than Article 18.2(1)(a). 
 
8. Neither Party may have recourse to dispute settlement under this Agreement for a matter 
arising under Article 18.2(1)(a) without first pursuing resolution of the matter in 
accordance with this Article. 
 
Article 18.7: Labor Roster 
 
1. The Parties shall establish within six months after the date of entry into force of this 
Agreement and maintain a roster of up to 12 individuals who are willing and able to serve 
as panelists in disputes arising under Article 18.2(1)(a). Unless the Parties otherwise agree, 
four members of the roster shall be selected from among individuals who are non-Party 
nationals. Labor roster members shall be appointed by mutual agreement of the Parties and 
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may be reappointed. Once established, a roster shall remain in effect for a minimum of 
three years, and shall remain in effect thereafter until the Parties constitute a new roster. 
 
2. Labor roster members shall: 
(a) have expertise or experience in labor law or its enforcement, or in the resolution of 
disputes arising under international agreements; 
(b) be chosen strictly on the basis of objectivity, reliability, and sound judgment; 
(c) be independent of, and not affiliated with or take instructions from, either Party; and 
(d) comply with a code of conduct to be established by the Commission. 18-5 
 
3. Where a Party claims that a dispute arises under Article 18.2(1)(a), Article 22.9 (Panel 
Selection) shall apply, except that the panel shall be composed entirely of panelists meeting 
the qualifications in paragraph 2. 
 
Article 18.8: Definitions  
 
For purposes of this Chapter: 
 
labor laws means a Party’s statutes or regulations, or provisions thereof, that are directly 
related to the following internationally recognized labor rights: 
(a) the right of association; 
(b) the right to organize and bargain collectively; 
(c) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; 
(d) a minimum age for the employment of children and the prohibition and elimination of 
the worst forms of child labor; and 
(e) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and 
occupational safety and health. 
For greater certainty, the setting of standards and levels in respect of minimum wages by 
each Party shall not be subject to obligations under this Chapter. Each Party’s obligations 
under this Chapter pertain to enforcing the level of the general minimum wage established 
by that Party. 
 
statutes or regulations means: 
(a) for the United States, acts of the Congress or regulations promulgated pursuant to acts 
of the Congress that are enforceable by action of the federal government; and 
(b) for Chile, acts or regulations promulgated pursuant to acts that are enforceable by the 
agency charged with enforcing Chile’s labor laws. 18-6 
 
Annex 18.5 
Labor Cooperation Mechanism 
 
Establishment of a Labor Cooperation Mechanism 
1. Recognizing that bilateral cooperation on labor matters will provide enhanced 
opportunities for the Parties to improve labor standards, and to further advance their 
common commitments, including the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 




Organization and Principal Functions 
2. Each Party shall designate an office within its ministry of labor to serve as a point of 
contact to support the work of the Labor Cooperation Mechanism.  
3. The Parties’ labor ministries shall carry out the work of the Labor Cooperation 
Mechanism by developing and pursuing cooperative activities on labor matters, including  
by working jointly to: 
(a) establish priorities for cooperative activities; 
(b) develop and periodically revise a work program of specific cooperative activities in 
accord with such priorities; 
(c) exchange information regarding labor policies and the observance and effective 
application of labor law and practice in the Parties’ territories; 
(d) exchange information on and encourage best labor practices, including best practices 
adopted by multinational firms, small and medium enterprises, and other private 
enterprises, as well as by labor organizations; 
(e) advance understanding of, respect for, and effective implementation of the principles 
reflected in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its 
Follow-up (1998); 
(f) promote the collection and publication of comparable data on labor standards, labor 
market indicators, and enforcement activity; 18-7 
(g) arrange periodic labor cooperation review sessions at the request of either Party, review 
current cooperative activities, and provide guidance for future cooperative activities 
between the Parties; and 
(h) develop recommendations to their respective governments for their consideration.  
 
Cooperative Activities 
4. The Labor Cooperation Mechanism may undertake cooperative activities on any labor 
matter it considers appropriate, such as on: 
(a) fundamental rights and their effective application: legislation, practice, and 
implementation related to the core elements of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up (1998) (freedom of association and the 
effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining, elimination of all forms of forced 
or compulsory labor, abolition of child labor, including the worst forms of child labor in 
compliance with the ILO Convention Nº182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour (1999), 
and elimination of employment discrimination); 
(b) labor relations: forms of cooperation among workers, management, and governments, 
including the resolution of labor disputes; 
(c) working conditions: legislation, practice, and implementation related to occupational 
safety and health; prevention of and compensation for work-related injuries and illness; and 
employment conditions; 
(d) issues related to small and medium enterprises: promotion of fundamental rights at 
work; improvement of working conditions; forms of cooperation between employers and 
worker representatives; and social protection services agreed between workers’ 
organizations and employers or their associations; 
(e) social protections: human resource development and employment training; work 
benefits; social programs for workers and their families; migrant workers; worker 
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adjustment programs; and social protection, including social security, income security, and 
health care services; 18-8 
(f) technical issues and information exchange: programs, methodologies, and experiences 
regarding productivity improvement; labor statistics, including comparable data; current 
ILO issues and activities; consideration and encouragement of best labor practices; and the 
effective use of technologies, Including those that are Internet-based; and 
(g) implications of economic integration between the Parties for advancing each Party’s 
labor objectives. 
 
Implementation of Cooperative Activities 
5. The Parties may carry out cooperative activities under this Annex through any form they 
deem appropriate, including by: 
(a) exchanging government delegations, professionals, and specialists, including through 
study visits; 
(b) sharing information, standards, regulations and procedures and best practices, including 
through the exchange of pertinent publications and monographs; 
(c) organizing joint conferences, seminars, workshops, meetings, training sessions, and 
outreach and education programs; 
(d) developing collaborative projects or demonstrations; 
(e) undertaking joint research projects, studies, and reports, including by engaging 
independent experts with relevant expertise; 
(f) drawing on the expertise of academic and other institutions in their territories in 
developing and implementing cooperative programs and by encouraging relationships 
between such institutions on technical labor issues; and  
(g) engaging in technical exchanges and cooperation. 
 
6. In identifying areas for cooperation and carrying out cooperative activities, the Parties 
shall consider views of their respective worker and employer representatives, as well as 
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